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Reasoning about Agent Programs using ATL-like Logics
Nitin Yadav and Sebastian Sardina ⋆
RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia.
Abstract. We propose a variant of Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL)
grounded in the agents’ operational know-how, as defined by their libraries of
abstract plans. Inspired by ATLES, a variant itself of ATL, it is possible in our
logic to explicitly refer to “rational” strategies for agents developed under the
Belief-Desire-Intention agent programming paradigm. This allows us to express
and verify properties of BDI systems using ATL-type logical frameworks.
Keywords: Agent Programming, Reactive plans, ATL, Model Checking.
1 Introduction
The formal verification of agent-oriented programs requires logic frameworks capable
of representing and reasoning about agents’ abilities and capabilities, and the goals they
can feasibly achieve. In particular, we are interested here in programs written in the fam-
ily of Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) agent programming systems [5, 6, 18], a popular
paradigm for building multi-agent systems. Traditional BDI logics based on CTL (e.g.,
[17]) are generally too weak for representing ability; their success has primarily been
in defining “rationality postulates,” i.e., constraints on rational behaviour. Further, such
logics do not encode agents’ capabilities (as represented by their plan libraries) and
thereby leave a sizable gap between agent programs and their formal verification.
Recent work (e.g., [1, 2, 9]) has better bridged the gap between formal logic and
practical programming by providing an axiomatisation of a class of models that is de-
signed to closely model a programming framework. However, this is done by restricting
the logic’s models to those that satisfy the transition relations of agents’ plans, as de-
fined by the semantics of the programming language itself. In such a framework, it is
not possible to reason about the agent’s know-how and what the agent could achieve if
it had specific capabilities. It is also not possible to reason about coalition of agents.
Our aim thus is to define a framework, together with model checking techniques,
that will allow us to speculate about a group of agents’ capabilities and what they can
achieve with such capabilities under the BDI paradigm, which enables abstract plans
written by programmers to be combined and used in real-time under the principles of
This requires the ability to represent capabilities directly in our logic. To that end,
we adapt ATLES, a version of ATL (Alternating-time Temporal Logic) [3] with Ex-
plicit Strategies [20], to our purpose. ATL is a logic for reasoning about the ability of
agent coalitions in multi-player game structures. This is achieved by reasoning about
⋆ We would like to thank Lawrence Cavedon for earlier discussions on the topic of this paper.
We acknowledge the support of the Australian Research Council under grant DP120100332.
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strategies (and their success) employed by teams of agents: 〈〈A〉〉ϕ expresses that the
coalition team of agents A has a joint strategy for guaranteeing that the temporal prop-
erty ϕ holds. Walther et al. [20], standard ATL does not allow agents’ strategies to be
explicitly represented in the syntax of the logic. They thus rectified this shortcoming
by defining ATLES, which extends ATL by allowing strategy terms in the language:
〈〈A〉〉ρϕ holds if coalition A has a joint strategy for ensuring ϕ, when some agents are
committed to specific strategies as specified by so-called commitment function ρ.
In this paper, we go further and develop a framework—called BDI-ATLES—in
which the strategy terms are tied directly to the plans available to agents under the no-
tion of practical reasoning embodied by the BDI paradigm [6, 18]: the only strategies
that can be employed by a BDI agent are those that ensue by the (rational) execution of
its predefined plans, given its goals and beliefs. The key construct 〈〈A〉〉ω,̺ϕ in the new
framework states that coalitionA has a joint strategy for ensuring ϕ, under the assump-
tions that some agents in the system are BDI-style agents with capabilities and goals as
specified by assignmentsω and ̺, respectively. For instance, in the Gold Mining domain
from the International Agent Contest,1 one may want to verify if two miner agents pro-
grammed in a BDI language can successfully collect gold pieces when equipped with
navigation and communication capabilities and want to win the game, while the oppo-
nent agents can perform any physically legal action. More interesting, a formula like
〈〈A〉〉∅,∅ϕ ⊃ 〈〈A〉〉ω,̺ϕ can be used to check whether coalition A has enough know-how
and motivations to carry out a task ϕ that is indeed physically feasible for the coalition.
We observe that the notion of “rationality” used in this work is that found in the
literature on BDI and agent programming, rather than that common in game-theory
(generally captured via solution concepts). As such, rationality shall refer from now on
to reasonable constraints on how the various mental modalities—e.g., beliefs, intention,
goals—may interact. In particular, we focus on the constraint that agents select actions
from their know-how in order to achieve their goals in the context of their beliefs.
Finally, we stress that this work aims to contribute to the agent-oriented programing
community more than to the (ATL) verification one. Indeed, our aim is to motivate the
former to adopt well-established techniques in game-theory for the effective verification
of their “reactive” style agent programs.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 ATL/ATLES Logics of Coalitions
Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) [3] is a logic for reasoning about the ability of
agent coalitions in multi-agent game structures. ATL formulae are built by combining
propositional formulas, the usual temporal operators—namely,© (“in the next state”),
2 (“always”), 3 (“eventually”), and U (“strict until”)—and a coalition path quantifier
〈〈A〉〉 taking a set of agents A as parameter. As in CTL, which ATL extends, temporal
operators and path quantifiers are required to alternate. Intuitively, an ATL formula
〈〈A〉〉φ, where A is a set of agents, holds in an ATL structure if by suitably choosing
their moves, the agents in A can force φ true, no matter how other agents happen to
1 http://www.multiagentcontest.org/
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move. The semantics of ATL is defined in so-called concurrent game structures where,
at each point, all agents simultaneously choose their moves from a finite set, and the next
state deterministically depends on such choices. More concretely, an ATL structure is
a tuple M = 〈A, Q,P ,Act, d,V , σ〉, where A = {1, . . . , k} is a finite set of agents,
Q is the finite set of states, P is the finite set of propositions, Act is the set of all
domain actions, d : A × Q 7→ 2Act indicates all available actions for an agent in a
state, V : Q 7→ 2P is the valuation function stating what is true in each state, and
σ : Q × Act|A| 7→ Q is the transition function mapping a state q and a joint-move
a ∈ D(q)—where D(q) = ×|A|i=1d(i, q) is the set of legal joint-moves in q —to the
resulting next state q′.
A path λ = q0q1 · · · in a structureM is a, possibly infinite, sequence of states such
that for each i ≥ 0, there exists a joint-move ai ∈ D(qi) for which σ(qi, ai) = qi+1.
We use λ[i] = qi to denote the i-th state of λ, Λ to denote the set of all paths in M,
and Λ(q) to denote those starting in q. Also, |λ| denotes the length of λ as the number
of state transitions in λ: |λ| = ℓ if λ = q0q1 . . . qℓ, and |λ| = ∞ if λ is infinite. When
0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ |λ|, then λ[i, j] = qiqi+1 . . . qj is the finite subpath between the i-th and
j-th steps in λ. Finally, a computation path in M is an infinite path in Λ.
To provide semantics to formulas 〈〈·〉〉ϕ, ATL relies on the notion of agent strategies.
Technically, an ATL strategy for an agent agt is a function fagt : Q+ 7→ Act, where
fagt(λq) ∈ d(agt, q) for all λq ∈ Q+, stating a particular action choice of agent agt at
path λq. A collective strategy for group of agents A ⊆ A is a set of strategies FA =
{fagt | agt ∈ A} providing one specific strategy for each agent agt ∈ A. For a collective
strategy FA and an initial state q, it is not difficult to define the set out(q, FA) of all pos-
sible outcomes of FA starting at state q as the set of all computation paths that may
ensue when the agents in A behave as prescribed by FA, and the remaining agents
follow any arbitrary strategy [3, 20]. The semantics for the coalition modality is then
defined as follows (here φ is a path formula, that is, it is preceded by©, 2, or U , and
M, λ |= φ is defined in the usual way [3]):
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉φ iff there is a collective strategy FA such that for all computations
λ ∈ out(q, FA), we have M, λ |= φ.
The coalition modality only allows for implicit (existential) quantification over
strategies. In some contexts, though, it is important to refer to strategies explicitly in
the language, e.g., can a player win the game if the opponent plays a specified strategy?
To address this limitation, Walther et al. [20] proposed ATLES, an extension of ATL
where the coalition modality is extended to 〈〈A〉〉ρ , where ρ is a commitment function,
that is, a partial function mapping agents to so-called strategy terms. Formula 〈〈A〉〉ρφ
thus means that “while the agents in the domain of ρ act according to their commit-
ments, the coalition A can cooperate to ensure φ as an outcome.”
The motivation for our work stems from the fact that ATLES is agnostic on the
source of the strategic terms: all meaningful strategies have already been identified. In
the context of multi-agent systems, it may not be an easy task to identify those strate-
gies compatible with the agents’ behaviors, as those systems are generally built using
programming frameworks [5] that are very different from ATL(ES).
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2.2 BDI Programming
The BDI agent-oriented programming paradigm is a popular and successful approach
for building agent systems, with roots in philosophical work on rational action [6] and
a plethora of programming languages and systems available, such as JACK, JASON,
JADEX, 2APL [5], and GOAL [11], among others.
A typical BDI agent continually tries to achieve its goals (or desires) by selecting an
adequate plan from its plan library given its current beliefs, and placing it into the in-
tention base for execution. The agent’s plan library Π encodes the standard operational
knowledge of the domain by means of a set of plan-rules (or “recipes”) of the form
φ[α]ψ: plan α is a reasonable plan to adopt for achieving ψ when (context) condition φ
is believed true. For example, walking towards location x from y is a reasonable strat-
egy, if there is a short distance between x and y (and the agent wants to be eventually at
location x). Conditions φ and ψ are (propositional) formulas talking about the current
and goal states, respectively. Though different BDI languages offer different constructs
for crafting plans, most allow for sequences of domain actions that are meant to be
directly executed in the world (e.g., lifting an aircraft’s flaps), and the posting of (in-
termediate) sub-goals !ϕ (e.g., obtain landing permission) to be resolved. The intention
base, in turn, contains the current, partially executed, plans that the agent has already
committed to for achieving certain goals. Current intentions being executed provide a
screen of admissibility for attention focus [6].
Though we do not present it here for lack of space, most BDI-style programming
languages come with a clear single-step semantics basically realizing [18]’s execution
model in which (rational) behavior arises due to the execution of plans from the agent’s
plan library so as to achieve certain goals relative to the agent’s beliefs.
3 BDI-ATLES: ATL for BDI Agents
Here we develop an ATL(ES)-like logic that bridges the gap between verification frame-
works and BDI agent-oriented programming languages. The overarching idea is for BDI
programmers to be able to encode BDI applications in ATL in a principled manner.
Recall that ATL(ES) uses strategies to denote the agent’s choices among possible
actions. For a BDI agent these strategies are implicit in her know-how. In particular, we
envision BDI agents defined with a set of goals and so-called capabilities [7, 16]. Gen-
erally speaking, a capability is a set/module of procedural knowledge (i.e., plans) for
some functional requirement. An agent may have, for instance, the Navigate capability
encoding all plans for navigating an environment. Equipped with a set of capabilities, a
BDI agent executes actions as per plans available so as to achieve her goals, e.g., explor-
ing the environment. In this context, the BDI developer is then interested in what agents
can achieve at the level of goals and capabilities. Inspired by ATLES, we develop a
logic that caters for this requirement without departing much from the ATL framework.
In this work, we shall consider plans consisting of single actions, that is, given
BDI plan for the form φ[α]ψ, the body of the plan α consists of one primitive action.
Such plans are akin to those in the GOAL agent programming language [11], as well as
universal-plans [19], and reactive control modules [4]. Let ΠPAct be the (infinite) set of
all possible plan-rules given a set of actions Act and a set of domain propositions P .
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3.1 BDI-ATLES Syntax
The language of BDI-ATLES is defined over a finite set of atomic propositions P ,
a finite set of agents A, and a finite set of capability terms C available in the BDI
application of concern. Intuitively, each capability term c ∈ C (e.g., Navigate) stands
for a plan library Πc (e.g., ΠNavigate). As usual, a coalition is a set A ⊆ A of agents.
A capability assignment ω consists of a set of pairs of agents with their capabilities of
the form 〈agt : Cagt〉, where agt ∈ A and Cagt ⊆ C. A goal assignment ̺, in turn,
defines the goal base (i.e., set of propositional formulas) for some agents, and is a set
of tuples of the form 〈agt : Gagt〉, where agt ∈ A and Gagt is a set of boolean formulas
over P . We use Aω to denote the set of agents for which their capabilities are defined
by assignment ω, that is, Aω = {agt | 〈agt : Cagt〉 ∈ ω}. Set A̺ is defined analogously.
The set of BDI-ATLES formulas is then exactly like that of ATL(ES), except that
coalition formulas are now of the form 〈〈A〉〉ω,̺ϕ, where ϕ is a path formula (i.e., it is
preceded by©, 2, or U), A is a coalition, and ω and ̺ range over capability and goal
assignments, respectively, such that Aω = A̺. Its intended meaning is as follows:
〈〈A〉〉ω,̺ϕ expresses that coalition of agents A can jointly force temporal con-
dition ϕ to hold when BDI agents in Aω (orA̺, since A̺ = Aω) are equipped
with capabilities as per assignment ω and (initial) goals are per assignment ̺.
Notice that we require, in each coalition (sub)formula, that the agents for which
capabilities and goals are assigned to be the same. This enforces the constraint that BDI-
style agents have both plans and goals. Hence, a formula of the form 〈〈A〉〉∅,{〈a1:{γ}〉}ϕ
would not be valid, as agent a1 has one goal (namely, to bring about γ), but its set
of plans is not defined—we cannot specify what its rational behavior may be. This
contrasts with formula 〈〈A〉〉{〈a1 :∅〉},{〈a1:{γ}〉}ϕ, a valid formula in which agent a1 is
assumed to have no plans (i.e., agent has empty know-how) and one goal.
Example 1. Consider the following simplified instance of the gold mining domain with
three locations A, B and C, a gold piece ⋄ at location C, the depot located at B (rect-
angle location), and two players Ag (BDI agent) and En (enemy):
EnA Ag
B
⋄ C
Players can move LEFT/RIGHT, PICK/DROP gold, or remain still by executing spe-
cial action NOOP. PropositionXY , whereX ∈ {Ag,En} and Y ∈ {A,B,C}, encodes
that player X is at location Y ; whereas propositions GA, GB , GC , GAg, and GEn de-
note that the gold is at location A/B/C or being held by agent Ag/En, respectively. The
depot is assumed to be always at B and hence is not represented explicitly.
The winning condition for player Ag is ψWIN=GB ∧ AgB: the player wins when
collocated with gold at the depot.
Among the many capabilities available encoding the know-how information of the
domain, we consider the following three. The Collect capability includes plans to pick
gold, such as AgC ∧GC [PICK]GB: if gold needs to be at B and agent is at C, where
there is indeed gold, then execute the PICK action. Similarly, capability Deposit con-
tains plans like GAg ∧ AgB[DROP]GB , for example, to allow dropping of gold at the
desired location. Lastly, capability Navigate has plans for moving around, such as
AgC [LEFT]AgB to move left from location C to (desired destination) B. ⊓⊔
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AgB , EnA
GC
q0
AgC , EnB
GC
q1
AgC , EnC
GAg
q2
AgB , EnC
GAg
q3
AgB , EnC
GB
q4
AgC , EnC
GC
q5
AgC , EnC
GEn
q6
AgC , EnB
GEn
q7
AgC , EnB
GB
q8
AgB , EnB
GC
q9
〈r, r〉 〈p, r〉 〈l, n〉 〈d, n〉
〈n, n〉
〈p, p〉
〈n, r〉
〈n, p〉 〈n, l〉 〈n, d〉
〈n, n〉
〈n, r〉
〈r, r〉
〈n, l〉
〈n, l〉
(a) A section of the BDI-ATLES alternating model.
q0
q1 q2 q3 q4
q9 q5 q1 q2
λ+1
λ+2
f1Ag ∈ Σ
Ag
Π,G
f2Ag 6∈ Σ
Ag
Π,G
Ag B
∧G
C
[r
]G
B
AgC ∧GC [p]GB
AgC ∧GAg[l]AgB
AgB ∧GAg[d]GB
r
p l d
n
r n p
(b) Traces λ+1 and λ+2 resultant from
strategies f1Ag and f2Ag, respectively
Fig. 1. A fragment of a Gold domain model and a picture showing rational traces and strategies.
Actions LEFT, RIGHT, PICK, DROP, and NOOP are abbreviated with their first letter.
The remaining of the section involves providing the right interpretation to such for-
mulas, under the assumption that agents act rationally as per the BDI paradigm.
3.2 BDI-ATLES Semantics
A BDI-ATLES concurrent game structure is a tupleM=〈A, Q,P ,Act, d,V , σ, Θ〉, with:
– A, Q, P , Act, d, V and σ are as in ATL(ES).
– There is a distinguished dummy action NOOP ∈ Act such that NOOP ∈ dagt(q) and
σ(q, 〈NOOP, . . . , NOOP〉) = q, for all agt ∈ A and q ∈ Q, that is, NOOP is always
available to all agents and the system remains still when all agents perform it.
– Capability function Θ : C 7→ F(ΠPAct) maps capability terms to their (finite) set of
plans. (Here, F(X) denotes the set of all finite subsets X .)
Example 2. Figure 1(a) shows a partial model for the gold game. The game starts at
state q0, with players Ag and En located at B and A, resp., and gold present at C.
From there, player Ag has a winning strategy: reach the gold earlier and deposit it in
the depot. This can be seen in path q0q1q2q3q4. However, this is possible only when the
agent Ag is indeed equipped with all three capabilities. If, on the other hand, the agent
lacks capability Collect, for instance, then player En may actually manage to win the
game, as evident from the path q0q1q5q6q7q8. ⊓⊔
BDI-ATLES models are similar to ATLES ones, except that capability, rather than
strategy term, interpretations are used. In a nutshell, the challenge thus is to characterize
what the underlying “low-level” ATL strategies for agents with certain capabilities and
goals are. We call such strategies rational strategies, in that they are compatible with
the standard BDI rational execution model [18]: they represent the agent acting as per
her available plans in order to achieve her goals in the context of her beliefs.
So, given an agent agt ∈ A, a plan-library Π , and a goal base G, we define ΣagtΠ,G
to be the set of standard ATL strategies for agent agt in M that are rational strategies
when the agent is equipped with plan-library Π and has G as (initial) goals, that is,
those ATL strategies in which the agent always chooses an action that is directed by
one of its available plans in order to achieve one of its goals in the context of its current
beliefs. The core idea behind defining set ΣagtΠ,G is to identify those “rational traces” in
the structure that are compatible with the BDI deliberation process in which the agent
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acts as per her goals and beliefs. Traces just generalize paths to account for the actions
performed at each step, and are hence of the form λ+ = q0 a1 q1 · · · aℓ qℓ such that
q0qq · · · qℓ is a (finite) path. Rational strategies, then, are those that only yield rational
traces. Technically, we define rational traces in three steps. First, we define a goal-
marking function g(λ+, i) denoting the “active” goal base of the agent at the i-th stage
of trace λ+. Basically, a goal-marking function keeps track of the goals that the agent
has already achieved at each stage in a trace. Second, we define Exec(φ[α]ψ, g, λ+)
as the set of indexes (i.e., stages) in trace λ+ where the plan φ[α]ψ may have been
executed by the agent: the plan’s precondition φ was true, ψ was an active goal of the
agent (as directed by goal-marking function g), and α was indeed performed. Finally,
we say a trace λ+ is deemed “rational” if at every moment in the run the agent executed
one of its plans. That is, for every index i, it is the case that i ∈ Execagt(φ[α]ψ, g, λ+),
for some plan φ[α]ψ in her know-how library. Finally, we use ΣagtΠ,G to denote the set
of all ATL strategies whose executions always yield rational traces. The laborious, and
arguably boring, technical details of all this can be found in the Appendix.
Example 3. Figure 1(b) depicts two possible traces λ+1 and λ+2 (for agent Ag) com-
patible with strategies f1Ag and f2Ag, resp. Trace λ
+
1 is due to the agent executing ac-
tions as per its applicable plans, as evident from the plan labeling. For example, at
state q1, the agent is in a gold location and hence executes the pick action as per plan
AgC ∧GC [PICK]GB . Consequently the strategy f1Ag is rational, as it yields rational trace
λ+1 . Trace λ
+
2 on the other hand does not obey the BDI rationality constraints (e.g., the
agent remains still in location B, despite an applicable plan being available). ⊓⊔
Assuming that set ΣagtΠ,G of rational strategies has been suitably defined, we are
ready to detail the semantics for formulas of the form 〈〈A〉〉ω,̺ϕ. Following ATLES we
first extend the notion of a joint strategy for a coalition to that of joint strategy under
a given capability and goal assignment. So, given a capability (goal) assignment ω (̺)
and an agent agt ∈ Aω (agt ∈ A̺), we denote agt’s capabilities (goals) under ω (̺)
by ω[agt] (̺[agt]). Intuitively, an 〈ω, ̺〉-strategy for coalition A is a joint strategy for
A such that (i) agents in A ∩ Aω only follow “rational” (plan-goal compatible) strate-
gies as per their ω-capabilities and ̺-goals; and (b) agents in A\Aω follow arbitrary
strategies. Formally, an 〈ω, ̺〉-strategy for coalition A (with Aω = A̺) is a collective
strategy FA for agents A such that for all fagt ∈ FA with agt ∈ A ∩ Aω , it is the case
that fagt ∈ ΣagtΠ,G , where Π = ∪c∈ω[agt]Θ(c) and G = ̺[agt]. Note no requirements are
asked on the strategies for the remaining agents A\Aω, besides of course being legal
(ATL) strategies. Also, whereas ATLES ρ-strategies are collective strategies including
all agents in the domain of commitment function ρ, our 〈ω, ̺〉-strategies are collective
strategies for the coalition of concern only. This is because commitment functions in-
duce deterministic agent behaviors, whereas capabilities and goals assignments induce
non-deterministic ones. We will elaborate on this issue below.
Using the notions of 〈ω, ̺〉-strategies and that of possible outcomes for a given
collective strategy from ATL (refer to function out(·, ·) from Preliminaries), we are
now able to state the meaning of BDI-ATLES (coalition) formulas:2
2 As with ATL(ES), ϕ ought to be a path formula and is interpreted in the usual manner. We
omit the other ATL-like cases for brevity; see [20].
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M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ω,̺ϕ iff there is a 〈ω, ̺〉-strategy FA such that for all 〈ω, ̺〉-strategies
FAω\A forAω \A, it is the case that M, λ |= ϕ, for all paths λ ∈ out(q, FA ∪FAω\A).
Intuitively, FA stands for the collective strategy of agents A guaranteeing the satisfac-
tion of formula ϕ. Because FA is a 〈ω, ̺〉-strategy, some agents in A—those whose
capabilities and goals are defined by ω and ̺, resp.—are to follow strategies that corre-
spond to rational executions of its capabilities. At the same time, because other agents
outside the coalition could have also been assigned capabilities and goals, the chosen
collective strategy FA needs to work no matter how such agents (namely, agentsAω\A)
behave, as long as they do it rationally given their plans and goals. That is, FA has to
work with any rational collective strategy FAω\A. Finally, the behavior of all remaining
agents—namely those in A \ (A ∪ Aω)—are taken into account when considering all
possible outcomes, after all strategies for agents in A ∪ Aω have been settled.
While similar to ATLES coalition formulas 〈〈A〉〉ρϕ, BDI-ATLES coalition formu-
las 〈〈A〉〉ω,̺ϕ differ in one important aspect that makes its semantics more involved.
Specifically, whereas commitment functions ρ prescribe deterministic behaviors for
agents, capabilities and goals assignments yield multiple potential behaviors for the
agents of interest. This nondeterministic behavior stems from the fact that BDI agents
can choose what goals to work on at each point and what available plans to use for
achieving such goals. Technically, this is reflected in the strategies for each agent
in (Aω \ A)—those agents with assigned capabilities and goals but not part of the
coalition—cannot be (existentially) considered together with those of agents in A or
(universally) accounted for via the possible outcomes function out(·, ·), as such func-
tion puts no rationality constraints on the remaining (non-committed) agents. Thus,
whereas agents in A ∩ Aω are allowed to select one possible rational behavior, all ra-
tional behaviors for agents in (Aω \A) need to be taken into consideration.
We close this section by noting an important, and expected, monotonicity property
of BDI-ATLES w.r.t. changes in the goals and plans of agents.
Proposition 1. |= 〈〈A〉〉ω,̺ϕ ⊃ 〈〈A′〉〉ω′,̺′ϕ holds, provided that:
– A ⊆ A′, that is, the coalition is not reduced;
– ω[agt] ⊆ ω′[agt] and ̺[agt] ⊆ ̺′[agt], for all agt ∈ Aω ∩ A, that is, the goals and
capabilities of those BDI agents in the coalition are not reduced; and
– Aω \ A ⊆ Aω′ \ A′, that is, the set of non BDI agents outside the coalition is not
reduced (but could be new BDI agents outside the coalition);
– ω′[agt] ⊆ ω[agt] and ̺′[agt] ⊆ ̺[agt], for all agt ∈ Aω \ A, that is, the goals and
capabilities of those BDI agents outside the coalition are not augmented.
Informally, augmenting the goals/plans of agents in a coalition does not reduce the
ability of agents. This is because a collective 〈ω, ̺〉-strategy for coalition A to bring
about a formula would still work if more goals and plans are given to the agents in the
coalition (second condition). Observe, on the other hand, that augmenting the goals or
plans of those agents outside the coalition may yield new behavior that can indeed in-
terfere with the coalition’s original abilities (last condition). This even includes turning
BDI agents into non BDI agents (third condition). Of course, as in ATL, enlarging the
coalition does not reduce ability (first condition).
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foreach ϕ′ in Sub(ϕ) w.r.t. M = 〈A, Q,P ,Act, d,V, σ, Θ〉 do
case ϕ′ = p : [ϕ′]M = V(p);
case ϕ′ = ¬θ : [ϕ′]M = ([TRUE]M \ [θ]M);
case ϕ′ = θ1 ∨ θ2 : [ϕ
′]M = [θ1]M ∪ [θ2]M;
case ϕ′ = 〈〈A〉〉ω,̺©θ : [ϕ
′]M = ws(Pre(A,ω,Θ, [θ]M̺ ) ∩ J̺K) ;
case ϕ′ = 〈〈A〉〉ω,̺2θ : ρ = [TRUE]M̺ ; τ = [θ]M̺ ;
while ρ 6⊆ τ do ρ = τ ; τ = Pre(A,ω,Θ, ρ) ∩ [θ]M̺ od;
[ϕ′]M = ws(ρ ∩ J̺K) ;
case ϕ′ = 〈〈A〉〉ω,̺θ1Uθ2 : ρ = [FALSE]M̺ ; τ = [θ2]M̺ ;
while τ 6⊆ρ do ρ = ρ∪τ ; τ = Pre(A,ω,Θ, ρ)∩[θ1]M̺ od;
[ϕ′]M = ws(ρ ∩ J̺K) ;
od;
return [ϕ′]M; Fig. 2. BDI-ATLES symbolic model checking.
4 BDI-ATLES Model Checking
Given a BDI-ATLES model M and a formula ϕ, the model checking algorithm for
BDI-ATLES computes the set of states in M that satisfy ϕ. To that end, the algorithm
has to take into account the rational choices of each BDI agent, that is, those choices
that are the consequence of the agent’s goals and capabilities specified by functions ̺
and ω in formulae of the form 〈〈A〉〉ω,̺ϕ. Roughly speaking, the algorithm restricts, at
each step, the options of BDI agents to their applicable plans. We start by extending the
model M to embed the possible goals (based on the goal assignment) of BDI agents
into each state, and then then discuss the model checking algorithm and its complexity.
So, given a BDI-ATLES model M=〈A, Q,P ,Act, d,V , σ, Θ〉 and a goal assign-
ment ̺, the goal-extended model is a modelM̺=〈A, Q̺,P ,Act, d̺,V̺, σ̺, Θ〉, where:
– Q̺ ⊆ Q ×
∏
agt∈A̺ 2
̺[agt] is the set of extended states, now accounting for the
possible goals of BDI agents. When q̺ = 〈q, g1, . . . , g|A̺|〉 ∈ Q̺, where q ∈ Q
and gi ⊆ ̺[agti], is an extended state, we use ws(q̺) = q and gl(agti, q̺) = gi
to project M’s world state and agti’s goals. To enforce belief-goal consistency
we require no agent ever wants something already true: there are no q̺ ∈ Q̺,
agt ∈ A̺, and formula γ such that V(ws(q̺)) |= γ and γ ∈ gl(agt, q̺).
– V̺(q̺) = V(ws(q̺)), for all q̺ ∈ Q̺, that is, state evaluation remains unchanged.
– d̺(agt, q̺) = d(agt,ws(q̺)), that is, physical executability remains unchanged.
– σ̺(q̺, a) = 〈q′, g′1, . . . , g
′
|A̺|
〉, where q′ = σ(ws(q̺), a) and g′i = gl(agti, q̺) \
{γ | γ ∈ gl(agti, q̺),V(q′) |= γ}, is the transition function for the extended model.
Model M̺ is like M though suitably extended to account for agents’ goals under
the initial goal-assignment ̺. Observe that the transition relation caters for persistence
of goals as well as dropping of achieved goals. Indeed, the extended system will never
evolve to an (extended) state in which some agent has some true fact as a goal. Hence,
the transition relation is well-defined within Q̺ states. More interesting, the extended
model keeps the original physical executability of actions and, as a result, it accom-
modates both rational and irrational paths. However, it is now possible to discriminate
between them, as one can reason about applicable plans in each state. Finally, it is not
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difficult to see that the extended model is, in general, exponentially larger than the orig-
inal one with respect to the number of goals maxagt∈A(|̺[agt]|) and agents |A̺|.
As standard, we denote the states satisfying a formula ϕ by [ϕ]. When the model is
not clear from the context, we use [ϕ]M to denote the states in M that satisfy the for-
mula ϕ. We extend ws(·) projection function to sets of extended states in the straight-
forward sense, that is, ws(S) =
⋃
q∈S{ws(q)}. Thus, ws([ϕ]M̺) denotes the set of
all world states in M that are part of an extended state in M̺ satisfying the formula
ϕ. Also, J̺K denotes the set of extended states where the agents’ goals are as per goal
assignment ̺; formally, J̺K = {q | q ∈ Q̺, ∀agt ∈ A̺ : gl(agt, q) = ̺[agt]}.
Figure 2 shows the model checking algorithm for BDI-ATLES. It is based on the
symbolic model checking algorithm for ATL [3] and ATLES [20]. The first three cases
are handled in the same way as in ATL(ES). To check the BDI-ATLES coalition formu-
lae 〈〈A〉〉ω,̺ϕ, we extend the model as above (relative to the formula’s goal assignment
̺), and then check the plain ATL coalition formula 〈〈A〉〉ϕ in such extended model.
Note that only the set of states having the goals as per the initial goal assignment are
returned—all agents’ initial goals are active in the first state of any rational trace.
Unlike standard ATL model checking, we restrict the agents’ action choices as per
their capabilities. This is achieved by modifying the usual pre-image function Pre(·) to
only take into account actions resultant from agents’ applicable plans. More concretely,
Pre(A,ω,Θ, ρ) is the set of (extended) states from where agents in coalition A can
jointly force the next (extended) state to be in set ρ no matter how all other agents (i.e.,
agents inA\A) may act and provided all BDI-style agents (i.e., agents with capabilities
defined under ω and Θ) behave as such. Formally:
Pre(A,ω,Θ, ρ) = {q | ∀i ∈ A, ∃ai ∈ d+̺ (i, q, ω,Θ),
∀j ∈ A\A, ∀aj ∈ d+̺ (j, q, ω,Θ) :σ̺(q, 〈a1, . . . , a|A|〉)∈ρ},
where auxiliary function d+̺ (agt, q, ω,Θ) denotes the set of all actions that an agent agt
may take in state q under capabilities as per defined in ω and Θ:
d+̺ (agt, q, ω,Θ) =


d̺(agt, q) if agt 6∈ Aω
d̺(agt, q) ∩ dBDI(agt, q,
⋃
c∈ω[agt]
Θ(c)) if agt ∈ Aω
An action belongs to set d+̺ (agt, q, ω,Θ) if it is physically possible (i.e., it belongs
to d̺(agt, q)), and BDI-rational whenever the agent in question is a BDI agent. To cap-
ture the latter constraint, set dBDI(agt, q,Π) is defined as the set of all rational actions
for agent agt in (extended) state q when the agent is equipped with the set of plans Π :
dBDI(agt, q,Π)=
{
{a | φ[a]ψ∈∆(agt, q,Π)} if ∆(agt, q,Π) 6= ∅
{NOOP} otherwise
where ∆(agt, q,Π)={φ[a]ψ ∈ Π | V(q) |= φ, γ ∈ gl(agt, q), ψ |= γ} is the set of all
applicable plans in Π at state q. So, summarising, function Pre(·, ·, ·, ·) is an extension
of the standard ATL Pre(·) function in which the agents that have goals and capabilities
defined—the BDI agents—do act according to those goals and capabilities.
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It is clear that the modified version of Pre(·) function does not alter the complexity
of the underlying ATL-based algorithm. In fact, the variation is similar to that used for
model checking ATLES, except that the action filtering does not come from strategy
terms, but from agent plans. This means that the algorithm runs in polynomial time
w.r.t. the size of model M̺ (which is exponential w.r.t. the original model M).
Theorem 1. Model checking a BDI-ATLES formula 〈〈A〉〉ω,̺ϕ (against a model M)
can be done in exponential time on the number of agents |A| and goals maxa∈A(|̺[a]|).
Of course, should we have included agents’ goals explicitly in models (rather than
using a succinct representation), as done with intentions in ATL+intentions (ATLI) [15],
the model checking problem would retain ATL’s polynomial complexity. The same
would apply if one just generalized ATLES to explicitly require all rational-strategies
be part of the model. The fact is, however, that generating such rational strategies by
hand (to include them in models) will be extremely involved, even for small problems.
In addition, our approach decouples agent’s mental attitudes from the physical ATL-like
model, and enables reasoning at the level of formulae without changing the model.
We shall note that the exponentiality may not show up in certain applications. In
many cases, for example, one is interested in just one BDI agent acting in an environ-
ment. In that case, only such agent will be ascribed goals and capabilities. Since it arises
due to agents with goals, the exponential complexity would therefore only be on the
number of goals for such agent. Similarly, in situations where all agents have a single
goal to achieve (e.g., to pick gold), the model checking would then be exponential on
the number of BDI agents only. In the next section we shall provide one interpretation
of goals for which the model checking problem remains polynomial.
5 BDI-ATLES with Maintenance Goals
So far, we have worked on the assumption that agents have a set of “flat” achievement
goals, goals that the agent needs to eventually bring about. One can however consider
alternative views of goals that could suit different domains. In particular, we have con-
sidered achievement goals with priorities and repetitive/reactive maintenance goals. In
the first case, the framework can be easily generalized to one in which goals can be
prioritized without an increase in complexity [? ].
A more promising case arises when goals are given a maintenance interpretation,
that is, (safety) properties that ought to be preserved temporally. For example, a Mars
robot has the goal to always maintain the fuel level above certain threshold. We focus
our attention on the so-called repetitive or reactive maintenance goals [10, 12]: goals
that ought to be restored whenever “violated.” Should the fuel level drop below the
threshold, the robot will act towards re-fueling. This type of goals contrast with proac-
tive maintenance goals [12], under which the agent is expected to proactively avoid
situations that will violate the goal. The fact is, however, that almost all BDI platform—
like JACK, JASON, and JADEX—only deal with the reactive version, thus providing a
middle ground between expressivity and tractability.
Technically, to accommodate maintenance goals within BDI-ATLES, one only
needs to do a small adaptation of the semantics of the logic so that goals are not
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dropped forever once satisfied, but “re-appear” when violated. We refer to this alter-
nate version of our logic as BDI-ATLESM . Of course, the model checking algorithm
discussed above also needs to be slightly adapted to deal with the new goal semantics.
Interestingly, one only needs to adapt the definition of a goal-extended model M̺ by
re-defining components Q̺ and σ̺(q̺, a); see [? ] for details.
Theorem 2. Model checking in BDI-ATLESMcan be done in polynomial time (w.r.t.
the model and the formula).
Hence, for (reactive) maintenance goals, we retain ATL(ES) polynomial complex-
ity.3 Of course, this bound is tight, as BDI-ATLESM subsumes ATL (just take ω = ϕ =
∅ in every coalition formula) and model checking ATL is PTIME-complete [3].
6 Discussion
We have developed an ATL-like logic that relates closely to the BDI agent-oriented pro-
gramming paradigm widely used to implement multi-agent systems. In the new logic,
the user can express the capability of agents equipped with know-how knowledge in
a natural way and can reason in the language about what agents can achieve under
such capabilities. Besides the general framework with standard achievement goals, we
argued that one could instead appeal to goals with priorities or a special type of main-
tenance goals. We provided algorithms for model checking in such a framework and
proved its (upper-bound) complexity in the various cases. Overall, we believe that this
work is a first principled step to bring together two different fields in the area of multi-
agent systems, namely, verification of strategic behaviour and agent programming.
The framework presented here made a number of assumptions requiring further
work. Due to valuation function V in a structure, all agents are assumed to have full
shared observability of the environment. This is, of course, a strong assumption in
many settings. We considered here basically reactive plans, akin to the language of
GOAL [11], certain classes of 2APL/3APL [8, 13], reactive modules [4], and univer-
sal plans [19]. We would like to explore the impact of allowing plan bodies having
sequences of actions, and more importantly, sub-goaling, as well as the possibility of
agents imposing (new) goals to other agents, via so-called BDI messages. Also, in the
context of complex plan bodies, one could then consider both a linear as well as inter-
leaved execution styles of plans within each agent (for its various goals). Most of these
issue appear to be orthogonal to each other, and hence can be investigated one by one.
With the core framework laid down, our next efforts shal focus on the above issues, as
well as proving whether the complexity result provided in Theorem 1 is tight.
We close by noting that, besides ATLES, our work has strong similarities and moti-
vations to those on plausibility [14] and intention [15] reasoning in ATL. Like ATLES,
however, those works are still not linked to any approach for the actual development of
agents, which is the main motivation behind our work. Nonetheless, we would like to
investigate how to integrate plausibility reasoning in our logic, as it seems orthogonal to
that of rational BDI-style behavior. Indeed, the plausibility approach allows us to focus
the reasoning to certain parts of an ATL structure using more declarative specifications.
3 Note the complexity of model checking ATLES is known only for memoryless strategies [20].
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A Rational strategies
Given a plan library Π and an initial goal base G for an agent agt in structure M, we
are to characterize those strategies for agt within M that represent rational behaviors:
the agent tries plans from Π in order to bring about its goals G given its beliefs [6, 18].
While technically involved, the idea to define set ΣagtΠ,G is simple: first identify those
paths in M that display rational behavior for the agent; second consider rational strate-
gies those that will always yield rational paths. We do this in three steps. First, we
identify constraints on how the goals of an agent can evolve in a path. Second, we de-
fine what it means for a plan to be tried by an agent in a path. Third, we identify those
(rational) paths that result from an agent’s deliberation process.
Before we start, we extend the notion of paths to account for the actions performed.
A trace is a finite sequence of alternating states and actions λ+ = q0 a1 q1 · · · aℓ qℓ such
that q0qq · · · qℓ is a (finite) path in M. As with paths, we use λ+[i] and λ+〈i〉 to denote
the i-th state qi and the i-th action ai, respectively, in trace λ+. The length |λ+| of a
trace is the number of actions on it; hence it matches the length of the underlying path.
Example 4. Figure 1(b) depicts two possible traces λ+1 and λ+2 for agent Ag that are
compatible with strategies f1Ag and f2Ag, respectively. The agent has ψWIN as its initial
goal, and is equipped with capabilities Navigate, Collect and Deposit. Trace λ+1 is re-
sultant from the agent executing actions as per its applicable plans, as evident from the
plan labeling. For example, at the state q1, the agent is collocated with the gold, and so
executes the PICK action as per plan AgC ∧GC [PICK]GB . Consequently, strategy f1Ag
is rational as it yields rational trace λ+1 . On the other hand, trace λ
+
2 does not obey the
rationality constraints: the agent executes the NOOP action at q0, although there is in
fact an applicable plan available.
Technically,λ+ is a rational trace for an agent agt ∈ A equipped with a plan-library
Π and having an initial goal base G, if for all i < |λ+|, either:
– there is an applicable plan φ[α]ψ ∈ Π (for some goal γ ∈ gG(λ+, i)) such that
i ∈ Execagt(φ[α]ψ, gG , λ+); or
– there is no applicable plan relative to the goal-marking gG and λ+〈i+1〉 = NOOP.
We denote ζagtΠ,G the set of all rational traces for agent agt with library Π and goal
base G. Also, to link traces and strategies, we define GetTrace(λ, fagt) to be the partial
function that returns the trace induced by a path λ and a strategy fagt, if any. Formally,
GetTrace(λ, fagt) = q0 a1 q1 . . . a|λ| q|λ| iff for all k ≤ |λ|: (i) qk = λ[k]; and (ii) there
exist a joint-move a ∈ D(qk) such that σ(qk, a) = qk+1 and fagt(λ[0, k]) = a[agt] =
ak+1 (where a[agt] denotes agent agt’s move in joint-move a).
Finally, the set of rational strategies is defined as follows:
Σ
agt
Π,G = {fagt |
⋃
λ∈Λ GetTrace(λ, fagt) ⊆ ζ
agt
Π,G},
where Λ ⊆ Λ is the set of finite paths in M. That is, a rational strategy fagt is one that
only yields rational traces.
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Goal evolution in traces BDI agents achieve their goals by means of acting as per
their plans. In this section, we shall identify what the possible achievement goals [10] an
agent may have at each moment in a path, under a blind commitment strategy [17]—the
most common strategy in BDI programming platforms—in which a rationality principle
states that an agent drops the goals it has already achieved. We discuss maintenance
goals in the next section as a special case.
To that end, we make use of so-called goal-marking function gG(λ+, i), for an agent
with an initial goal base G, which outcomes the “active” goal base of the agent at mo-
ment λ+[i] in trace λ+. As expected, the goal marking function returns the unfulfilled
subset of initial goals. Formally,
gG(λ
+, i) = {γ | γ ∈ G, (¬∃j ≤ i) V(λ+[j]) |= γ}.
In this setting, the agent picks an active goal and executes a plan for it. If the plan
fails to achieve the goal, the goal remains active and the agent can either pursue the
same goal or a different one. On the other hand, if the plan succeeds in bringing about
the goal, then the achieved goal is removed from the agent’s active goal set.
Plan executions in traces Agents developed under the BDI paradigm are meant to
execute actions as per the plans/know-how available to them. We shall next define what
it means for a trace to include an execution of a plan.
When it comes to selecting plans for execution, there are generally two core notions
in BDI programming. A plan is relevant if its intended effects are enough to bring about
some goal of the agent. Technically, given a trace λ+ and the goal-marking function g,
we say that a plan-rule φ[α]ψ is relevant at moment λ+[i] in the trace, with 0 ≤ i ≤
|λ+|, if there exists γ ∈ g(λ+, i) such that ψ |= γ. Furthermore, the plan is applicable
at λ+[i] if it is relevant and its context condition holds true, that is, V(λ+[i]) |= φ.
So, we identify the moments in which a particular plan may have been executed in
a trace by an agent. Formally, Execagt(φ[α]ψ, g, λ+) is the set of indices i such that (i)
λ+〈i+ 1〉 = α; and (ii) φ[α]ψ is applicable at λ+[i] under goal-marking g.
Rational traces and rational strategies We now have all the technical machinery to
define the set of rational traces—those that can be explained by the agent acting as per
its available plans in order to achieve its goals relative to its beliefs—and the set ΣagtΠ,G
of rational strategies used to define the semantics of BDI-ATLES.
Initially, an agent has a set of goals (initial goal base) that she wants to bring about.
The agent then chooses one goal to work on, and selects an applicable plan for such goal
from its plan library for execution. If the plan successfully brings about the goal, then
the agent deems the goal achieved and the plan finished. Traces that can be “explained”
in this way are referred to as rational traces.
B Priorities and Maintenance Goals
So far, we have studied BDI-ATLES under the assumption that agents have a set of “flat”
achievement goals, goals that the agent needs to eventually bring about. In this section,
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we consider our logic under two alternative views of the agent’s goal base that could
suit different domains, namely, achievement goals with priorities and repetitive/reactive
maintenance goals. Interestingly, the model checking problem for the latter special case
remains polynomial.
B.1 Goals with priority
The BDI-ATLES framework defined above treats all goals with equal importance, in
that a BDI agent may choose to execute an applicable plan for any active goal. In many
situations, though, an agent may prefer achieving certain goals first. Thus, a gardening
agent might want to both pluck fruits and collect dirt, but the former is of higher priority.
Similarly, a sales agent will generally prefer attending a customer or a phone call to do
some back-office task.
To accommodate goal bases with priorities, we extend the notion of goal assignment
(̺) as tuples of the form 〈agt : (Γ,≺)〉, where agt ∈ A, Γ is a finite set of boolean
formulas overP , and≺ is a partial-order relation over Γ specifying the priority over the
goals. As expected, an initial goal base G = (Γ0,≺0) consists of a set of goals formulas
Γ0 and a partial-order priority relation≺0 over such set. We use ≺agt to denote the goal
priority of agt ∈ A̺ in goal assignment ̺.
Roughly speaking, an agent always acts—by means of an applicable plan—towards
achieving a goal with highest priority. Should that be impossible (i.e., there is no ap-
plicable plan for such goals), the agent suspends those goals and tries to act towards
a next preferred goal, and so on. Note that, being achievement goals, these are meant
to be dropped whenever achieved. Moreover, goals at any level of importance could be
achieved as (un-intended) side effects of the agent’s own actions or even other agents’
actions.
To achieve all this, we update the definition of rational traces and strategies as
follows. A trace λ+ is rational for an agent agt ∈ A having an initial goal base
G = (Γ0,≺0) and a plan library Π , if for all i < |λ+| either: (here, gG(·, ·) is the
corresponding goal-marking function)
– there is an applicable plan φ[α]ψ ∈ Π at state λ+[i] for a goal γ ∈ gG(λ+, i) such
that i ∈ Execagt(φ[α]ψ, gG , λ+), and there is no γ′ ∈ gG(λ+, i) with an applicable
plan at λ+[i] and such that γ′ ≺0 γ; or
– there is no applicable plan at λ+[i] for any goal in gG(λ+, i) and λ+〈i+1〉 = NOOP.
Observe that the only difference with the original notion of rational traces is that an
agent cannot act on a lower priority goal if it has an applicable plan for a higher priority
goal. All other notions, including goal-marking functions and plan execution in traces
remain the same. We refer to this new variant as BDI-ATLESP .
Now, a model checking algorithm for BDI-ATLESP can be obtained by slightly
modifying the Pre(·, ·, ·, ·) function in the algorithm for BDI-ATLES. Instead of con-
sidering all applicable plans, the Pre function needs to just take into account applicable
plans for the most preferred goal(s). This can be easily achieved by using function
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∆+(agt, q,Π) in the definition of dBDI(agt, q,Π):
∆+(agt, q,Π) =
{φ[a]ψ ∈ ∆(agt, q,Π) |
(∃γ ∈ gl(agt, q)).ψ |= γ,
(¬∃φ′[a′]ψ′ ∈ ∆(agt, q,Π), γ′ ∈ gl(agt, q))
γ′ ≺agt γ ∧ ψ′ |= γ′}.
That is, ∆+(agt, q,Π) denotes the set of all highest-priority applicable plans at q:
there is no plan φ′[a′]ψ′ applicable at q and serving a higher-priority goal γ′.
We note that the complexity of model checking this variant with goal priorities
remains the same as that of BDI-ATLES. Indeed, the size of the extended model is still
exponential w.r.t. the original model. This is because the agent might achieve lower
priority goals as non-intended side effects, and as a result, one still needs to extend the
original states with the powerset of the initial goal base.
Nonetheless, the BDI-ATLESP variant is more general; if agents have equal priori-
ties on all their goals, then it is equivalent to the original BDI-ATLES framework. On
the other hand, priorities on goals can yield very different abilities among agents and
coalitions. In fact, the ability of an agent (or coalition) may depend on the priority of
other agents: an gold miner agent may be able to pick gold pieces only if the opponent
prefers exploring grid to picking gold.
Lastly, it is not difficult to provide different semantics to goal priorities. One can
imagine agents dropping goals or blindly waiting for a plan to become applicable when
none is available, rather than suspending the goal and acting on lower priority goals.
While it is straightforward to capture such semantics, the exponential complexity for
model checking still remains.
B.2 Maintenance goals
In order to force goals to “re-appear” when violated, we re-define the goal-marking
function gG(·, ·), which determines the goal base of an agent at a given i-th moment in
a trace λ+, as follows:
gG(λ
+, i) = {γ | γ ∈ G, V(λ+[i]) |= γ}.
Importantly, the rest of the definitions for plan execution and rational strategies remain
exactly the same. We shall refer to this alternate version of our logic as BDI-ATLESM .4
In terms of the model checking algorithm, the only change required is in the defini-
tion of a goal-extended model M̺, which is defined as above except for the following:
– The set of extended states Q̺ is defined as follows:
Q̺ =
{〈q, g1, . . . , g|A̺|〉 |
q ∈ Q, gi = ̺[agti] \ {γ | V(q) |= γ}};
– σ̺(q̺, a) = q
′
̺ iff σ(ws(q̺), a) = ws(q′̺).
It is not difficult to see now that the set of extended states is no longer exponential
w.r.t. the original set of states.
4 Note we do now allow achievement and maintenance goals to co-exist in the current setting.
